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Abstract: 
Mainstream pundits and media commentators saw the crisis in US-Turkey relations and the 
collapse of the Turkish currency in the crucial 2018-19 juncture as a result of Turkey's refusal to 
hand over to the US an American Evangelical priest. The analysis here shows that the roots of the 
conflict in times of crisis contexts, uncertainty and hegemonic instability, go far beyond political 
epiphenomena. They involve the weaponization of the US Treasury in the service of global power-
politics.   
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Introduction 
Turkey was thrust into a full-blown currency crisis when Donald Trump hoisted 
tariffs on Turkey’s steel and aluminium exports to the USA, the country’s most 
serious crisis since Erdogan’s AKP came to power 16 years ago. The Lira lost more 
than 40 percent of its value, albeit its most recent humble recovery. The pretext for 
Trump’s punishing attack on Turkey was the continued detention of the evangelical 
American Presbyterian missionary Andrew Brunson, described by Trump as a “fine 
gentleman and Christian leader”, who was arrested in October 2016 on charges of 
espionage accused of involvement in the attempted coup of July the same year.  
At first sight, the US-Turkey stand-off appears to be a uniquely Turkish problem 
triggered by a very public confrontation between two leading members of the “ring 
of autocrats” of the twenty-first century, Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
and worsened by the idiosyncratic and often misguided economic approach of both 
leaders. This is not the case. 
In the first place, the roots of the conflict are domestic. Public agitation over the fate 
of Brunson serves Trump’s domestic political agenda, appealing to his Christian 
right base that considers Brunson a martyr: Trump is using it for its own political 
benefit for the forthcoming US mid-term elections (Presidential election was also on 
the horizon), where evangelical turnout will be crucial for Republicans holding on 
to the Senate. Similarly, Erdogan aims at strengthening his domestic support base by 
appealing to Turkish pride and nationalism at a moment when Turkey and the US 
have diverging agendas in Syria and other conflicts in the greater Middle East, 
witness the rapprochement – albeit provisional, timid and deeply unstable – between 
Turkey, Russia and Iran. Evangelical turnout will be crucial for Republicans holding 
on to the Senate. 
However, the underlying motives for the drive to bring the Turkish economy to its 
knees lie in the bid by the US hegemon to displace and off-load its own crisis onto 
the back of emerging economies, by means of trade restrictions, economic sanctions, 
direct confrontation, and most importantly using the dollar’s reserve currency status 
to hit the currencies of all emerging economies and beyond.  
This is not rooted in the personality or psychology of Trump or Erdogan, and this 
is not just Turkey’s problem. It is a global problem carrying substantial risks of 
contagion, and hence conflict and war, in Asia, Latin America, Africa and 
Europe.  In the critical 2018-19 juncture, the prelude to the crisis of 2020 (re-
alignments over the Syrian war, the Corona virus pandemic etc.), the Turkish crisis 
looked the most vivid but, as we shall see below, there was much more going on 
between the US and the rest of the world.   
The global financial crisis and shifts in the global power system 
The first point to be made is that none of the underlying contradictions of the world 
economy have been resolved. Rather, they have only intensified. Soon after the 2008 
crisis hit the major economies, governments and central banks took off the books 
of the banks the worthless, or so-called toxic, assets, which were then transferred 
onto the states’ budgets rendering legal responsibility to the taxpayer to pay the debts 
of the banks (what in the relevant jargon is called “deleveraging”). The bailout 
operation and other similar measures, such as widespread “quantitative easing”, has 
cost more than 25 percent of global GDP, the landmark operation being the Greek 
case under the aegis of a German-led EU. This large-scale bailout has increased the 
volatility of the system without solving the problem.  By 2018, ten years after the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers, it had become increasingly clear that a new period 
of intensified crisis was gripping the global economy.  
Every national economy, whether big or small, seemed to have been locked in a 
perpetually escalating cycle of economic warfare. US sanctions against Iran, Russia, 
Turkey and Venezuela; and US trade war with China, the EU, Canada and 
Mexico. These acts of economic warfare, reminiscent of the inter-war period [1], are 
not only affecting the countries directly targeted, but indirectly also affect a long list 
of other countries which have close economic links with these targeted countries. 
For instance, Chinese producers buy iron ore for steel from Australia, Brazil, India, 
Iran, South Africa, and Ukraine, and bauxite for aluminium from Australia, Brazil, 
and the poor West African nation of Guinea. All are being affected, some very 
seriously.  
It seems that global trade and the US dollar are used as a weapon by the American 
President, who sees trade sanctions and tariffs, such as the onslaught he launched 
against Turkey, as an integral component of his drive to secure US’s geopolitical and 
economic interests at the expense of the others, even if this hurts its own close allies. 
Trump's “America First” policy is just this and configures its strategy as a response 
to the structural crisis of globalisation/financialisation. 
Trump is fully aware of the impact of his policies. The US’s “aggressive 
unilateralism”, which first emerged in the 1980s under Reagan, was now pushed to 
its limits. Trump is not some bizarre abnormality, but rather the genuine face of the 
vital interests of a declining superpower that is prepared to initiate a major crisis and 
huge devastation worldwide in order to stop – in vain – its eventual decline. Trump’s 
coming to power itself is but an epiphenomenon of the deeply embedded structural 
and historical changes and trends taking place in international political economy and 
the global system of power distribution. 
All such shifts are the results of an increasingly more volatile and chaotic 
international situation, which is the direct consequence of a process that Giovanni 
Arrighi, drawing from Antonio Gramsci, called hegemonic transition. During that 
period, systemic chaos is rather unavoidable. The late twentieth century saw renewed 
great power rivalry, system-wide financial excesses and bursting bubbles centred on 
the declining superpower, the US, and the emergence of new loci of power in 
Eurasia, in particular China and India. So, the core logic of this shift can be analysed 
properly within the context of major global structural changes and re-distribution of 
power, which have been affecting the world system for the last 30 years or so. 
Hegemonic transition 
When the authority of a global superpower is on the wane, this affects the entire 
world order and leads to instability. Even though the US still represents the largest 
and strongest economic and military power in the world – although in terms of 
Purchasing Power Parity China is now first – it is nevertheless struggling with severe 
weaknesses resulting from low economic growth and the protracted decline of its 
industry. The most important structural transformation that took place in the US-
led global economic system after WWII was a massive crisis in manufacturing 
manifesting itself as stagflation (economic stagnation accompanied by double-digit 
inflation). Falling profitability and weakening competitiveness led to the erosion of 
the production-led mode of accumulation in the United States (the twin crisis of 
Fordism and the Keynesian management of aggregate demand). When the 
productive power (and capacity) of the US started to decline, financial speculation 
began to play a major role in order to compensate the loss of profit rates in 
production and trade. One of the most striking features of the US economy has 
become the rise of the rentier and the money capitalist. This was further reinforced 
with the massive upsurge of the US bond markets and, from the late 1980s in 
particular, of the junk bond market. This vast financial sector expansion greatly 
advanced speculation, artificially boosting the power of the dollar.  
The decline in productive capacity and the ever-widening gap between productive 
and financial accumulation led to recurrent financial and economic crises in every 
corner of the world. The global chain of extreme financialisation and speculative 
profiteering broke in 2007-09, only to be transplanted into the Euro-zone via the 
over-leveraged banking sector. The Euro-zone was and remains the weakest link in 
every financial crisis because it is centred around the primacy of Germany’s economy 
and institutions. The EU/Euro-zone lacks any fiscal or banking cohesion and the 
body of Treaties regulating the “union” prohibits any sharing of the costs of the 
crisis. To put simply, Germany uses the institutional settings of the EU-Eurozone 
to re-cycle its surpluses making the European periphery poorer and herself richer. 
From “Q Easing to Q Tightening”, and the Turkey conundrum 
Even if the US economy is in decline in terms of its productive capacity and the 
share of global trade, one aspect of it still dominates the global economy: 
dollar seigniorage, or the dominant role of the US dollar in international trade and 
finance. This is the privilege to profit from the usage of the dollar by the rest of the 
world as international reserve currency in global trade. All states have to acquire 
funds of the internationally acceptable money in order to be able to pay for goods 
and services in global markets. A state first has to earn an international currency 
from abroad before it can buy anything from abroad. This constraint does not exist 
for the US because the international currency since 1944 is the US dollar.  The US 
does not need to earn dollars abroad. The US simply prints dollars at home, which 
gives the United States an “exorbitant privilege”. 
As a result, the US Federal Reserve could dictate the level of international rates 
through moving the US domestic interest rates, thus determining the costs of credit 
internationally. For decades, America borrows from practically the entire world 
without keeping the reserves of any other currency. Because the dollar is the de facto 
global reserve currency, America does not have to compete with other currencies in 
interest rates, and even at low interest rates capital flies to the dollar. The more 
dollars are circulated outside the US, or invested by foreign owners in American 
assets, the more the rest of the world has had to provide the US with goods and 
services in exchange for these dollars. The US even has the luxury of having its debts 
denominated in its own currency. Let us be more analytical. 
When international credit is cheap economic operators with access to cheap 
international credit borrow money and invest in projects which seem viable, given 
the level of low interest rates.  However, when the US decides to make credit 
expensive (sometimes very expensive) in order to gain competitive advantage or for 
political reasons, suddenly, such “normal” and “sound” investments may find 
themselves going bankrupt because of this sudden contraction of cheap credit. As 
in real war, so in economic warfare: surprise is the thing to do in order to win. 
Because only the American state can issue the international reserve currency, the US 
dollar, the Wall Street, the hub of global financial activity together with the City of 
London, can swing international economy between oversupplying credit at one time 
and contracting it at another without even providing a reasonable time of notice. As 
in real war, so in economic warfare: surprise is the key element. This is exactly what 
happened in the 2018-19 juncture. 
Since the 2007-08 global financial crisis the reliance of financial markets on policy 
decisions taken by the American Fed has expanded to unprecedented 
levels. Immediately after the global crisis hit the US in 2007, the Fed began what was 
called Quantitative Easing, a type of Keynesian generation of money – in force 
buying up bonds to revive the flow of credit to a shrinking economy. The Fed 
bought a staggering sum of bonds from the struggling banks, which increased up to 
4.5 trillion dollars from the modest range of $850 to $900 billion in 2010. Since then, 
four global central banks: the US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank (ECB), 
Bank of Japan and Bank of England have been engaged in QE programs – as the 
adage goes: when the American Fed sneezes, the rest catch a cold. The result of this 
QE was that the central banks flooded markets with an unprecedented flow of funds 
through auctions and lending facilities, approximately creating 4 billion dollar new 
money a day, and thus financial markets were saved.  
This (deflationary) operation plunged the interest rates to zero in an effort to prevent 
an economic collapse. No talk about increasing wages or investing in infrastructure 
and welfare provision. At any event, these sums of money were in turn invested in 
any part of the world offering high returns as US bonds paid near zero interest. The 
hope was that lenders go on to pass that liquidity along as credit to companies and 
households, thus stimulating anaemic economies.  A large amount of this liquidity 
went into junk bonds in the shale oil sector, which subsidised in reality high-cost US 
shale production, despite the fact that only a few shale companies were generating 
enough cash to pay for their spending and dividends, and into the US housing 
market which experienced a mini boom, both of which played a key role in the initial 
recovery of the economy from the 2007-08 financial crisis. Private investors, who 
were looking for new and more profitable avenues to park their investments, low 
interest new money they borrowed from the Fed, started pumping large amounts of 
this into emerging markets, such as Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, India and 
China, where the economies are booming and the US bonds could potentially bring 
back high returns.  
Thus, the corporations as well as private individuals in emerging markets had access 
to a large amount of cash at their disposal. Even the Russian market received some 
liquidity dollars until the Trump initiation of the US sanctions in early 2018. As a 
result, during the last ten years, the supply of cheap dollars to the global system has 
risen to unprecedented levels, exacerbated by the US, British, German and Japanese 
QE programmes. Total global debt (the debt of households, governments, 
corporations and the financial sector) soared to a record $233 trillion in the third 
quarter of 2017, according to a report from the Institute of International Finance in 
Washington. And it continues rising. Today – April 2020 – the global dead increased 
further to the record level of $325 trillion, due to a halt in the global economy 
brought about by the Corona pandemic. This trend will continue, especially since 
the global GDP is falling. 
As long as the emerging markets were growing and earning export dollars at times 
of low interest rates, this debt was manageable. Because of near-zero interest rates, 
combined with a weak dollar, this level of debt was not difficult to pay for 
consistently growing emerging economies. However, even though this low-interest 
credit has helped boost economic growth in the short-term, heavy reliance on this 
has made the economies of emerging countries vulnerable to sudden financial 
changes and surprise economic warfare. If the interest rates begin going up quickly, 
as is currently the case, then many debtors will not be able to pay their debts and the 
world will again be facing a 2008-style catastrophe. The emerging market economies’ 
massive dollar debt is the key vulnerability even for still expanding emerging 
economies, such as Turkey. Turkish companies in 2018 owed an estimated $229 
billion in foreign-denominated debt, which was more than one-third of the country’s 
GDP.  
But everything began to change. The US Federal Reserve ended its programme of 
QE in 2017, and started to reverse it, i.e. selling off the financial assets it had 
purchased, and hence effectively taking dollars out of the financial system, given the 
relatively stable performance of the American economy. By mid-2018 the Federal 
Reserve retreated from markets by reducing the amount it reinvested after the bonds 
in its portfolio reached maturity. Global finance was now de facto in the new era 
of Quantitative Tightening (QT). The Federal Reserve raised its policy rates five 
times, from 0.25 to 1.5 percent. The Bank of England raised its policy rate once, 
back to 0.5 percent and then again to 0.75%. As a result, the dollar’s value began to 
rise.  
The rise in the value of dollar, accompanied by two successive interest-rate rises by 
the USA Fed, has made debt payments for countries, corporations and individuals 
far more difficult. This is direct US financial policy which is deliberately precipitating 
a major new economic crisis across the emerging world, especially in Iran, Turkey, 
Russia, South Africa and China. This strategy was only recently reversed due to the 
Corona pandemic, when both the US and the UK began dropping their interest rate. 
But let us go back to the 2018 juncture. 
The stronger dollar means that emerging markets in particular are facing 
uncertainties: for companies, and individuals, in these countries that have issued 
dollar-denominated bonds, their interest payment burdens just got a lot heavier, and 
investors worry about the ability of emerging market debtors to pay off their dollar-
denominated debt.  The Institute of International Finance (IIF) estimated in July 
2017 that global debt amounted to 327 percent of the world's annual economic 
output (GDP) by the first quarter of 2017 and the rise was driven principally by 
emerging market borrowing. By the end of 2018, there was nearly 1 trillion dollar 
less global QE than in 2017, and the peak for total emerging market dollar debt 
falling due came in 2019, with more than 1.2 trillion dollars maturing.  In other 
words, there will be an equivalent of 1.2 trillion less dollars in the world in 2019.  This 
was simply done in order to choke off dollar supply.[2] 
Prelude to 2020: Bankrupting the global South in 2018-19 
The motivations for this trade and currency war are also political: the US punishes 
Turkey, Iran and Russia for having a divergent geo-political agenda in Europe, the 
Middle East and Central Asia that clashes strategically with that of the USA. 
However, whereas it is clear to us that the economic warfare between the USA and 
Turkey (as well as other emerging powers) has structural causes, it remains to be 
seen whether this can be translated into political divergence, something which would 
have serious implications as regards Turkey's NATO membership and global peace. 
Political and security dynamics have a relative autonomy and cannot be reduced to 
financial economics alone.  
The ability of the US government to control the global supply of money through its 
global reserve currency, the dollar, is considered to be the most effective weapon of 
the US, far more deadly than its grand military machinery. The value of US dollar is 
now rising strongly against all other currencies, in particular the currencies of 
emerging economies. The Corona pandemic gave the US dollar another boost. The 
Trump regime is also initiating provocative trade wars and sanctions against Russia, 
Iran, China and Venezuela. Turkey is not alone in this: it suddenly has a lot in 
common with Iran, Russia, and China, although these are fragile geo-political 
alliances, witness the fallout between Russia and Turkey over Syria – and, perhaps, 
Libya. The US seems to be aiming at a domestic economic advantage via pushing 
the global South into bankruptcy. This global financial and trade offensive, launched 
by the Trump administration, has already created huge uncertainty in Asia, Latin 
America and the EU.  Peter Gowan, in his seminal work, The Global Gamble, noted 
that “the US economy depends upon constantly reproduced international monetary 
and financial turbulence. …” and “Wall Street” in particular “depends upon chaotic 
instabilities in ‘emerging market’ financial systems”[3]. The Corona pandemic apart, 
today’s refugee crisis in the eastern Mediterranean might blow out of all proportions 
to the extend it serves US global financial interests and global hegemonic positioning 
vis-à-vis China and Russia.   
This is yet another clear manifestation of the fact that the world is currently going 
through a dangerous interregnum. Interregnum, here, as elaborated by Gramsci, can 
be understood as a period where one arrangement of hegemony is waning, but prior 
to the full emergence of another. It is poised between inward-looking old hegemonic 
powers, and reluctant new emergent ones. The US is a declining superpower, with a 
crumbling infrastructure and a shrinking share of the global economy. China is an 
ascending superpower, with a burgeoning industrial and technological infrastructure, 
a growing share of world trade and increasing self-confidence, but not ready yet to 
lead the world. The post-WWII arrangements that centred power on the Euro-
Atlantic hub and Japan under the primacy of the USA were shattered first by 
the stagflation of the 1970s and then by the global financial crisis of 2008, and 
currently are fast losing ground in the midst of economic nationalism, trade wars, 
sanctions and the Corona pandemic. This is what forces the ruling elites in many 
countries to unconstrained economic and political nationalism and authoritarianism. 
A new international system is in the making by the arrival of new dynamic actors 
that demand a redistribution of power. This, coupled with the phenomenon of 
enduring austerity, is basically what causes the breakdown of the global order and 
forging an authoritarian turn. Leadership, order, and regional and global governance 
are no longer assured. With the breakdown of the key economic and financial 
structures put in place after the WWII, every major power, especially the declining 
hegemon, the US, seems to be focusing on the protection of its own interests, 
leading to financial and economic warfare and extending the possibilities for a new 
real global war.  
We do not know with certainty yet what the ultimate impact of the current stand-
off between Trump’s America and a number of emerging powers, from Turkey to 
China and Russia, will be. For the time being, the Corona global pandemic and the 
crisis in Syria/eastern Mediterranean are the major battlefields [4]. However, it is 
almost certain that our world is, once again, entering a historical moment where 
uncertain global circumstances and the authoritarian, austerity-driven, agenda of 
unpredictable political leaders have “conspired” to initiate a major shift in the way 
world economy and finance are organised.   
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